On Sunday, August 20, 2006, Lebanon's Prime priest Fouad Siniora recommend that Israel, if it 'behaves wisely,' could be in a position to enter into a peace treaty with Lebanon. Don't schedule the celebrations just yet. Throughout the procedure of its long history, the Middle East has been a graveyard for optimism. There, the promise of peace has typically proved more illusory than a desert mirage. Therefore, the offer needs to be tested to conclude if it is credible. Even if it is, major obstacles could still block the way to peace in the middle of Lebanon and Israel.
Prime priest Siniora's willingness to pursue peace with Israel could be ascertained by determining whether he is willing to engage in direct and unconditional negotiations with Israel aimed at reaching a bilateral peace treaty. Israel should test the Prime Minister's commitment to peace by piquant him to Jerusalem for such talks. Afterward, rhetoric would have to give way to diplomacy.
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If the Lebanese Prime priest is serious about peace, the path to peace in the middle of Israel and Lebanon is relatively uncomplicated in terms of the substance involved. An trade would sound that the historic conflict in the middle of Israel and Lebanon is "finally terminated," supply for full gentle relations in the middle of the two countries, conclude the status of the disputed Shebaa Farms area in creating a secure, recognized, and agreed border, supply for the disarming of Hezbollah and offer assurances that both parties would take accountability to prevent attacks against the other from being launched from their soil, and would end any economic boycotts.
Nonetheless, uncomplicated as the path to peace might be, a host of obstacles would likely make the peace process perilous. A sight at those potential barriers is useful in assessing the near- or medium-term prospect for a peace treaty in the middle of Lebanon and Israel.
The Historic Arab Narrative:
The historic Arab description that sees Israel as an "artificial" and "illegitimate" state could color attitudes against a bilateral peace agreement. The bias could be tilted severely toward a prolonged ceasefire that falls far short of peace and full gentle relations.
In 1977, previous Israeli Foreign priest Abba Eban explained, "...history is the enemy of the Arab-Israeli reconciliation. The past is the adversary of the future. The vision that Arabs deduce form their history has never included the idea of a Jewish sovereignty in the heart of the Middle East..." Such attitudes can be overcome to the extent that a bilateral peace treaty becomes possible, as they were in Egypt and Jordan. However, in a weak state with a weak government, not to mention a fairly large share of the habitancy that is radicalized, the exertion could prove much more daunting.
Lebanon's Internal Dynamics:
Lebanon rests on a fragile, often uneasy, equilibrium in the middle of diverse religious groups. The religious equilibrium continues to shift toward an expanding Muslim majority and a shrinking Christian minority. Muslims comprise Shia, Sunnis, and Druze. Christians comprise Maronites, Roman Catholics, and Greek Orthodox. As a corollary of its diverse population, the Library of Congress' Country Study on Lebanon explains, "sectarianism (or confessionalism) is the dominant social, economic, and political reality. Divisiveness has come to define that which is Lebanon... While Muslims and Christians have lived together in Lebanon for over a century, their deep disagreements over the Lebanese political formula and state make it unrealistic to treat all Lebanese as members of one communal unit... Lebanon's somewhat peculiar political ideas has reinforced sectarian identification and consciousness." The description adds, "Each sect has its own set of personal status laws... The confessional ideas of personal-status laws strengthens the role of communal religious leaders and impedes the evolution of Lebanese nationalist or universalist secular ideas."
These dynamics translate into a weak government that might not be able to gain adequate communal sustain to cease a peace treaty with Israel. With the Shia population, radicalized by longstanding sustain from Syria and Iran, now comprising up to 45% of Lebanon's population, favorite sentiment in Lebanon is likely to run against a peace treaty. The Christians alone could not cease such an trade without the risk of a fresh civil war.
At the same time, Lebanon's internal dynamics also supply an ideal environment in which "state within a state" entities can flourish. In the 1970s, Palestinian terrorist groups enjoyed a large degree of autonomy and used Lebanon as a staging ground for cross-border terrorist attacks against Israel. From the late 1980s to the present, Hezbollah has dominated south Lebanon and launched terrorist attacks against Israel from there. Fresh from what it perceives to have been a "victory" on list of the inconclusive outcome from the up-to-date combat in the middle of Israel and Hezbollah, Hezbollah is not likely to be very keen on efforts to bring about a bilateral Lebanon-Israel peace accord. Furthermore, even if Hezbollah could be persuaded by Lebanon's Government to accept such a peace treaty, breakaway factions or newly-formed radical groups would likely have the capability to supplant Hezbollah in the absence of broad-based communal sustain for bilateral peace.
Regional Geopolitics:
Lebanon is likely to remain an leading piece of a growing geopolitical struggle in the middle of the Middle East's forces of "Rejectionism" and "Moderation." Such a battle could put supplementary strains on Lebanon's weak government and divisive society.
Iran and Syria will continue to spearhead the Rejectionist element. Both have broad work on with regard to Hezbollah. Syria still sees Lebanon as a historic part of "Greater Syria" and is vying to keep Lebanon within its sphere of influence. Syria could well exertion to use Lebanon as a bargaining chip for pursuing its own demands with Israel and avoiding increased gentle isolation. A bilateral Lebanon-Israel peace trade would shrink the pool of the Middle East's "confrontation states" and weaken Syrian regional influence. An erosion of Syrian work on could exacerbate internal pressures for reform within Syria.
Iran sees Lebanon's Shia habitancy as a natural base for expanding its Islamic Revolution and building a de facto Shia Caliphate that includes Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon, not to mention incorporating Shia populations spread across other Middle Eastern states and beyond. Moreover, its role is not incompatible with Syria's political realities, as the Shia and minority Alawites have long cooperated against the Sunnis in Syria and Syria has aligned itself with Iran since 1980.
So long as Syria is positioned to exert important work on in Lebanon and the Shia remain steadfast partners in helping perpetuate the Alawite Ba'athist government in Damascus--and Iran could adapt Syria toward those ends--Syria likely will not resist a de facto Caliphate. With Iraq being pulled in the direction of Iran despite the presence of more than 100,000 American soldiers there, the regional equilibrium of power is starting to tilt more toward Iran and away from the United States and West. That trend will tend to supplementary deepen Iranian-Syrian cooperation.
At a minimum, the Rejectionist group is likely to try to dry any tough negotiating positions that might be adopted by Lebanon. Following Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, Syria and the Palestine Liberation organization (Plo) launched a gentle nasty in the Arab world aimed at blocking the possibility of a detach peace in the middle of Egypt and Israel. Later, at a sensitive occasion in the early stages of the Egyptian-Israeli peace process, Morocco's King Hassan praised Sadat's "firmness" against what he described as "Israeli pretentions."
If that does not impede progress, terrorists could instigate a major terrorist attack or series of attacks to sabotage the peace process. In March 1978, the Plo seized a bus in Israel and killed 32 Israelis on the eve of Israeli Prime priest Menachem Begin's trip to the United States to supplementary the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. If such attacks do dinky to abort the peace process, a campaign of assassinations and car bombings directed at Lebanese leaders could be undertaken, much as occurred during the early 1980s. Moreover, Lebanon's Shia could be encouraged by Iran to seek a new governing association based on current demographic realities. Such a bid could shatter Lebanon's delicate political structure and bring an end to any peace process that might be underway.
Radical Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, both of whose leaders are hosted by Damascus, could seek to foment unrest among Lebanon's Palestinian population. Lebanon's political leaders remain opposed to granting Palestinians full proprietary of citizenship, even those born in Lebanon. They fear that such an arrangement would upset the current sectarian equilibrium upon which Lebanon's political and economic ideas rests. Hence, even if Lebanon embraces a long-term goal for the resettlement of Palestinians in a Palestinian state, radical Palestinian leaders could still provoke such unrest to help block a potential peace treaty.
Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia are likely to head up the Moderate camp. In no small part on list of those three states, the Arab League is already attempting to counter the money Iran is providing to Hezbollah for Lebanon's reconstruction. "This is a war over the hearts and mind of the Lebanese, which Arabs should not lose to the Iranians this time," a senior Arab League valid explained. Concern over Iranian hegemony could tend to erode the longstanding Arab historical narrative, particularly as the Moderate exertion is led by two countries that have entered into peace treaties with Israel.
Negotiating Obstacles:
The biggest danger of a breakdown in negotiations would come from an exertion by Lebanon to link a peace trade to extensive Middle East peace. With Syrian and Palestinian demands likely irreconcilable for the time being, such linkage could only prevent a bilateral peace trade in the middle of Lebanon and Israel. Syria would seek to bring the Golan Heights into the calculus while radical Palestinian groups would seek a "right of return" of all Palestinian refugees and their descendants to Israel. Both would greatly complicate the gentle calculus and the latter quiz, would be a "deal breaker."
In expanding to linkage, Lebanon could seek the fulfillment of prior conditions before proceeding with potential peace talks. Lebanon could seek that Israel turn over a portion of the disputed Shebaa Farms area to Lebanon as a gesture of good faith. It could seek that Israel turn over operate of that area to the United Nations in advance. Early in the Egyptian-Israeli talks, Egypt demanded a warrant that Israel would commit in progress to turning over all of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. Later, Egypt requested that Israel demonstrate its commitment to peace by turning over the West Bank to Jordan and Gaza Strip to Egypt before any trade was reached. Afterward, Egypt sought a transfer of the town of El Arish as a "good faith" gesture. Historically, such gestures have gone unrewarded in the Middle East. Most recently, Israel's unilateral relinquishment from the Gaza Strip in 2005 did dinky to mitigate terrorist attacks launched from there.
In response to Sadat's demands, Begin replied, "Nobody can get whatever for nothing." At the time, Prime priest Begin's seeming "intransigence" was widely criticized from within and face Israel. However, well before Sadat had made his dramatic trip to Israel, Israel had agreed to the principle of withdrawal, but the extent and implementation of such a relinquishment depended on the trade to a peace accord, rather than whatever less than a full peace e.g., a ceasefire or truce extension.
Ultimately, Egypt moderated its stance and dropped its quiz, for prior conditions. That improvement led to the victorious Camp David Summit in 1978. The Summit led to a breakthrough trade that paved the way to a bilateral peace trade the following year.
Outlook for Lebanon-Israel Peace Treaty:
Given the above background information, odds appear to run strongly against the achievement of a bilateral Lebanon-Israel peace trade in the near-term. Given the hazards of a weak Lebanese government, fragile sectarian equilibrium coupled with Lebanon's changing demographics, regional geopolitical situation that is arguably tilting more toward Iran, and potential procedural pitfalls, the obstacles are probably too great to overcome, particularly within the next 3-5 years, if not longer. Neither Egypt nor Jordan faced such an array of barriers. Egypt was a strong state, was guided by a visionary risk-taking leader, and had the political capacity to break free of Arab Rejectionism. Jordan's King Hussein had enjoyed a long period of behind-the-scenes cooperation with Israel and a strong association with the United States, and those factors coupled with Egypt's previously breaking the taboo of recognizing Israel, greatly reduced the risks of his formalizing peace with Israel.
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